



SIXTH DRAFT COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS on the Competition policy annual report 2025

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- Version 1 sent on 28.04.2026 - changes appear **in blue highlight**
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COMPROMISE A

Covers AM: 29-107, 109, 165, 250,

Reclaiming the EU's strategic autonomy through competition policy, innovation and digital sovereignty

1. Recalls the EU's strong competition framework *and its due enforcement [AM 33 Dibrani et al.]* as a tool to step up competitiveness across all industries; underlines that EU policies should not be pursued in isolation and that competitiveness concerns cannot be interpreted as shortcomings in competition policy; recalls that EU competition rules must *be coherent with principles enshrined in the Treaties [AM 36 Andresen]* and should support *the implementation of* EU policies, *including such as* those covering industry, trade, consumers, ~~and~~ financial services *and defence [AM 31 Ferber]*, *while ensuring a stable framework that fosters investments, growth and ability to scale under fair conditions [AM 32 Squarta]*; *underlines that competition policy should contribute to the integration and deepening of the European capital markets and support the objectives of the Savings and Investments Union [AM 30 Schwab]*; ~~recalls that EU competition rules must be consistent with EU law and the principles enshrined in the Treaties [AM 36 Andresen];~~
 - 1a. *Highlights that well-functioning competition is a key driver of productivity growth and long-term competitiveness in the Union; notes that stronger competition policy enforcement is associated with higher total factor productivity and a more efficient allocation of labour and capital; stresses therefore that effective competition policy and enforcement contributes to fair employment conditions is essential for protecting workers against adverse impacts, including on wages, enhancing productivity, innovation and strengthening a resilient and sustainable European market;* ~~[AM 37 Dibrani et al., AM 38 Andresen; AM 64 Saramo];~~
2. Firmly believes that the Draghi and Letta reports should *be used as a base for setting contribute to shaping [AM 41 S&D]* priorities in the competition field, and calls for these reports to be followed up on *as a matter of urgency [AM 45 Ferber]*; *takes note of Mario Draghi's estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed [AM 41 Dibrani et al.]; emphasises that consumer interests should remain central, while taking into account the need for competition policy to contribute to key objectives, such as competitiveness, resilience, security, strategic autonomy and sustainability [AM 79 Falcone]; welcomes the Draghi report's proposal for a flexible market investigation tool (the "New Competition Tool") to address market failures which cannot be tackled effectively under the current Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; notes that similar tools have already been successfully implemented at Member State level, and suggests that an EU-level NCT could help address structural competition issues across the Union;* *calls on the Commission to introduce such a tool to complement the existing framework [AM 42 Yon-Courtin; AM 77 Dibrani et al.; AM 165 Andresen];*
 - 2a. ~~*Calls on the Commission to assess take into due account of relevant factors, any additional benefits that may arise in antitrust and merger cases, including, where appropriate, such as efficiency and sustainability gains, without undermining the strict application of EU competition rules [AM 80 Yon-Courtin];*~~

- 2ba.** *Recognises the need to strengthen the European defence industrial base; stresses that competition policy must ensure fair access for SMEs and prevent excessive concentration in defence supply chains that could reduce resilience and increase dependency [AM 86 Dibrani et al.];*
- 2eb.** *Reiterates the fundamental role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in strengthening European competitiveness, promoting innovation and creating jobs; calls on the Commission to ensure that the enforcement of competition rules and digital policies takes into account their impact on SMEs [AM 69 Falcone];*
- 2dc.** *Underlines the importance of reducing energy costs to safeguard EU competitiveness, promoting **diversified net-zero energy sources** in line with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 of 4 June 2021 (Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act) and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214 of 9 March 2022 (Taxonomy Complementary Climate Delegated Act) ~~such as nuclear energy referenced in the Draghi report~~, while ensuring that an open, competitive and sustainable single market is balanced with supply security and increased EU energy autonomy [AM 87 Falcone]; stresses that fair, well-functioning, competitive, integrated and interconnected electricity markets are essential for strengthening the Union's industrial competitiveness and supporting more stable and affordable energy prices; underlines the importance of effective enforcement of competition rules in energy infrastructure and network access in order to safeguard the proper functioning of the single market [AM 50 Fuglsang and Dibrani] and to ensure fair pricing and better protect consumers [AM 250 Andresen];*
- 2ed.** *Notes the strategic role of critical raw materials for the energy transition and the objectives of the Critical Raw Materials Act in reducing geopolitical dependencies and strengthening supply chain resilience, calling on competition policy to support competitive markets across the value chain and pan-European investments [AM 88 Falcone];*
3. *Emphasises the key role competition plays in creating digital market alternatives and reducing dependence on **and dominance of** non-EU providers; encourages key infrastructures to be built to boost Europe's autonomy and innovation, including cloud services, AI infrastructures (data centres and connectivity), ~~and~~ financial market infrastructure **and resilient, interoperable and competitive European payment systems** [AM 52 Dibrani et al.] ~~to support the EU's digital sovereignty~~, in order to ensure open and contestable markets and reduce strategic dependencies [AM 54 Ferber]; observes **changes in evolving business practices and market structures, highlighting including a decline in cartel cases alongside a shift towards and potential new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion on prices**, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape **supported by data-driven analysis and evidence** [AM 83 Dibrani et al.];*
4. *Calls for a **European preference level playing field** in strategic sectors **and for the EU to use all available tools, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, public procurement rules and a robust merger review framework, to ensure that European firms can compete on merit and that third-country market participants are not advantaged by foreign state subsidies** [AM 59 Ferber]; stresses the importance of strengthening the resilience, diversification and security of European supply chains in strategic sectors promoting European capabilities and solutions, where appropriate, without compromising open markets [AM 63 Squarta];*

- 4a. *Underlines that competition authorities need improved data accessibility to ensure effective competition enforcement; calls for the reform of the EU Public Procurement Directive with a view to stresses the importance of improving data collection, facilitating access to procurement data for national competition authorities, and strengthening fraud detection mechanisms in their enforcement of competition policy; further calls on competition authorities to promote simplified procedures, enhance transparency, and improve market access for facilitate the participation of emerging SMEs in public procurement bids [AM 109 Yon-Courtin];*
5. *Underlines the importance of ~~i~~Important ~~p~~Projects of ~~e~~Common European ~~i~~Interest (IPCEIs) for financing large strategic EU projects; calls on the Commission to *streamline and simplify shorten or fast-track IPCEI [AM 65 Ferber, AM 67 Dibrani et al.]* notifications *procedures* as they are burdensome, *in particular* for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), *and to ensure proportionality [AM 66 Squarta], provide clear and predictable criteria for admissibility, and enhance transparency and legal certainty throughout the assessment process [AM 65 Ferber];**
6. *Welcomes the enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) as a necessary tool to create a level playing field and ~~in order to~~ address market distortions caused by foreign subsidies investments-[AM 71 Ferber, AM 74 Dibrani et al., AM 76 Falcone]; welcomes the FSR Guidelines; upholds that state aid which is not allowed under the EU treaties should also not be allowed from third countries [AM 74 Dibrani et al.]; calls for rigorous assessment of [AM 75 Andresen] ~~suggests addressing trade competition~~ distortions via the FSR and the *appropriate [AM 76 Falcone]* screening of foreign direct investment alongside traditional trade defence instruments; *calls on the Commission to strengthen the enforcement of the FSR with regard to online platforms and marketplaces established in third countries [AM 70 Aftias]; calls on the Commission to ensure that SMEs and smaller transactions are not disproportionately burdened by FSR compliance obligations [AM 71 Ferber];**
- 6a. *Underlines, according to the latest Eurobarometer and the EU Post-Electoral Survey 2024, Europeans expect the Union to prioritise addressing inflation, rising prices and the cost of living; stresses that ensuring fair and effective competition is an important element in tackling these challenges and should therefore remain a priority within competition policy [AM 46 Dibrani et al.];*
- 6b. *Underlines that ~~strict and consistent~~ competition policy ~~enforcement should~~ contributes to strengthening the economic, social and territorial cohesion ~~of across~~ the Union and its outermost regions; ~~highlights notes the that there are is a~~ persistent economic and infrastructural gaps between internal, rural, peripheral, outermost and island regions, and calls on the Commission to ~~systematically assess take into account~~ the territorial impact of competition decisions, in order to promote appropriate cohesion policies accompanying the development of the single market, ~~while ensuring the uniform application of competition rules~~ [AM 81 Falcone];*
- 6c. *Welcomes the signing of the EU-UK Competition Cooperation Agreement, a key step to strengthen coordination between the respective competition authorities [AM 85 Falcone];*

A more independent and effective European competition authority enforcement [AM 94 Dibrani et al.]

7-. Calls on the Commission to explore avenues towards strengthening the independence of the European competition enforcement [AM 103 Dibrani et al.];

7--. Stresses that strengthening the existing enforcement capacity is essential in the short term; calls on the Commission to ensure as a matter of urgency that DG Competition is sufficiently staffed with the necessary resources and technical expertise to effectively enforce antitrust law, the Digital Markets Act and merger rules [AM 107 Andresen];

7. ~~Calls for a real~~ Underlines the importance of competition enforcement being conducted in an impartial, politically independent manner; calls on the Commission to present an impact assessment on the merits of establishing a dedicated European competition authority ~~under, examining subsidiarity, the proper delineation between competition and regulatory functions, democratic oversight, which is separate from the executive branch to ensure no political interference, and integrates antitrust, merger control, State aid, consumer policy and digital enforcement accountability to Parliament, and the potential implications for the European Competition Network [AM 102 Ferber];~~ stresses the need for adequate staffing, expertise and powers;

Public Procurement

~~7a. — Recalls that public procurement has become overly complex and disproportionate, reducing participation by SMEs, which represent 98% of firms in the EU; calls for a review of EU public procurement rules to simplify procedures, enhance transparency, and favour facilitate the participation of emerging SMEs in public procurement bids [AM109 Yon-Courtin];~~

~~7b. — underlines that data accessibility is crucial for effective competition enforcement; calls for the reform of the EU Public Procurement Directive with a view to improving data collection, facilitating access to procurement data for national competition authorities, and strengthening fraud detection mechanisms [AM 109 Yon-Courtin];~~

COMPROMISE B

Covers AM: 108, 110-164, 166-208, 251

Competition in the digital age and enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) amid global challenges [AM 108 Dibrani et al]

8. Urges the Commission to fully enforce the EU competition rulebook, *including the Digital Markets Act, in a consistent, impartial and legally robust manner, [AM 110 Ferber]* to safeguard Europe's regulatory autonomy against political pressures, ~~particularly from the United States and China [AM 112 Schwab]~~; ~~notes with concern external pressure surrounding the continued attacks by the US administration and affiliated actors against the DMA and warns against the dangers of foreign interference [AM 111 Andresen];~~
9. Underlines that effective enforcement can only be achieved if rules to address abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and the DMA work together, combining ex ante and ex post approaches; calls on the Commission to streamline and better articulate the competition *and digital* rulebook [AM 118 Falcone];
 - 9a. ~~Welcomes the publication of the Commission's report on 28 April 2026 on the Review of the DMA Regulation; notes that, in its first report on the review of the DMA, the Commission believes that the DMA is fit for purpose and does not need to be amended at this stage, although it identifies particular areas of focus going forward, namely AI and cloud computing services, while highlighting that the DMA should not be seen in isolation when it comes to regulatory tools aiming to capture the AI or cloud value chain;~~
 - 9b. Calls for the ~~exercise of the~~ DMA review process ~~foreseen every three years, expected to take place in May 2026,~~ to be transparent, *evidence-based, proportionate [AM 137 Ferber], targeted [AM 139 Falcone] thorough* and ambitious, *while ensuring regulatory stability and avoiding unnecessary expansion of obligations for market participants [AM 138 Squarta]*; *insists that the regular review of the DMA, foreseen every three years, assesses systematically the effectiveness and practical impact of existing obligations, legal certainty for market participants, the cost of compliance, the DMA's interaction with sector-specific regulation, and the need for any adjustments to gatekeeper designation thresholds in light of market developments [AM 137 Ferber]; calls on the Commission to systematically include SMEs in the review consultations of the Digital Markets Act [AM 139 Falcone];*
10. ~~Supports stronger [AM 120 Andresen] enforcement under of the DMA on all market participants falling under the scope of its regulation regardless of nationality [AM 123 Navarrete]; notes the welcomes the Commission's recent market investigations into cloud service providers, such as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure and its two proceedings against Google on Android interoperability and fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to anonymised Google Search data, encourages the Commission to maintain an ambitious enforcement programme and to conclude open investigations within reasonable timeframes [AM 121 Ferber]; stresses that cloud obligations must be updated [AM 120 Andresen];~~

10. Stresses that increasing concentration in cloud services may undermine competition, innovation and the Union's strategic autonomy; highlights, that practices such as bundling, cloud marketplaces and contractual mechanisms including credits and spend commitments can reinforce vendor lock-in and limit switching or multi-cloud strategies [AM 126 Winzig]; stresses that cloud obligations must be updated [AM 120 Andresen]; notes that, in first report on the review of the DMA, the Commission reports that it opened three market investigations into cloud computing services in November 2025, two to assess whether Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services should be designated as gatekeepers for cloud computing services, and a third to assess whether the DMA can effectively address practices that may limit competitiveness and fairness in cloud computing services¹; calls on the Commission to use the cloud services market investigation to adjust DMA obligations and ensure they effectively address the barriers that prevent users from switching providers [AM 127 Falcone];
11. Recalls that enforcement of the DMA is still suboptimal; supports stronger [AM 120 Andresen] enforcement under of the DMA on all market participants falling under the scope of its regulation regardless of nationality [AM 123 Navarrete] and encourages the Commission to conclude open investigations within reasonable the timeframes provided for under the DMA Regulation [AM 121 Ferber]; notes that effective DMA enforcement requires adequate and sustainable resources; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authorities to ensure that [AM 132 Ferber] adequate and; suggests stable resources [AM 134 Falcone] are allocated to the DMA funding enforcement through the EU budget; calls therefore to explore sustainable finance solutions while respecting institutional balance, suggests notably to explore [AM 134 Falcone] funding through in addition, the introduction of a 'DMA fee', similar to the DSA;
- 11a. Calls on the Commission to make full and proactive use of all enforcement instruments provided for under the DMA, further market investigations, including non-compliance proceedings, inspections, interim measures, fines and periodic penalty payments, in order to prevent circumvention and ensure effective compliance [AM 135 Schwab];
- 11b. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance reservation of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies;
12. Welcomes the publication of the Commission's report on 28 April 2026 on the Review of the DMA Regulation; Calls for the regular exercise of the DMA review process, expected to take place in May 2026, to be remain transparent, evidence-based, proportionate [AM 137 Ferber], targeted [AM 139 Falcone] thorough and ambitious, while ensuring regulatory stability and avoiding unnecessary expansion of obligations for market participants [AM 138 Squarta]; insists that the review assesses the effectiveness and practical impact of existing obligations, legal certainty for market participants, the cost of compliance, the DMA's interaction with sector-specific regulation, and the need for any adjustments to gatekeeper designation thresholds in

¹ Press Release, Commission launches market investigations on cloud computing services under the Digital Markets Act (18.11.2025), available at https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-launches-market-investigations-cloud-computing-services-under-digital-markets-act-2025-11-18_en; see also Staff Working Document, page 43.

light of market developments [AM 137 Ferber]; calls on the Commission to include SMEs in the review consultations of the Digital Markets Act [AM 139 Falcone];

- 12a. *Welcomes that the Commission's first report on the review of the DMA recognises that the future-proofing tools incorporated by the co-legislators are crucial in enabling the framework to respond to developments in markets and technologies; Calls therefore on the Commission to enforce in a ensure consistent and future-proof application of manner the DMA to technological developments, by timely addressing AI-driven services and cloud-based infrastructures, in order to prevent new forms of lock-in, foreclosure or gatekeeping practices, including where gatekeepers leverage control over data, computing resources or integrated services to the detriment of emerging AI developers and innovative market entrants [AM 141 Schwab];*
13. *Welcomes that the Commission is already monitoring the deployment of AI tools within designated core platform services under the DMA; notes that, in its first report on the review of the DMA, the Commission reports that, with respect to AI services, it has started addressing various fairness and contestability issues that featured prominently in the public consultation, for instance, through its regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers on ensuring that default settings can be changed easily and that AI services have equal access to operating systems and notes that two specification proceedings were opened in January 2026 in relation to Alphabet that also have an AI dimension relating to interoperability and access to search data²; calls on the Commission to develop and apply new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the incumbents [AM 142 Dibrani et al.] and Urges the Commission to assess, within the upcoming DMA review, whether the current list of consider AI and cloud services as core platform services within the DMA adequately reflects market realities, including in areas such as AI models [AM 144 Ferber], AI chatbots [AM 150 Andresen] and cloud services [AM 144 Ferber], main virtual assistant services and connected TV operating systems [AM 146 Lalucq and Dibrani, AM 147 Yon-Courtin]; requests calls on the Commission to include SMEs, start-ups, industry associations, academic experts and consumer organisations across all Member States [AM 144 Ferber, AM 178 Andresen] in the DMA review consultations;*
14. *Stresses that DMA enforcement applies to all designated gatekeepers market participants regardless of nationality or origin, and calls on the Commission to apply DMA obligations consistently and without selectivity; welcomes the coordination between the Commission and national competition [AM 155 Ferber] notes Booking's gatekeeper status and recalls that the French and Spanish [AM 155 Ferber, AM 157 Benjumea] authorities on DMA-related conduct [AM 155 Ferber] penalised the company over its parity clauses [AM 155 Ferber, AM 157 Benjumea]; notes that Alphabet has leveraged its dominance in general online search to favour its own services in adjacent digital markets, thereby risking undermining fair competition and limiting user choice in the Union and calls on the Commission to enforce the rules in conformity with article 29 of the DMA; notes Amazon's price restriction practices which may harm the fairness and contestability of online marketplaces in the EU; notes the heavy use of behavioural techniques and non-neutral language in user interfaces which undermine the decision-making and free choice of end users across most end*

² Press Release, Commission opens proceedings to assist Google in complying with interoperability and online search data sharing obligations under the Digital Markets Act (27.1.2026), available at https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-opens-proceedings-assist-google-complying-interoperability-and-online-search-data-sharing-2026-01-27_en.

~~user interfaces [AM 153 Andresen; AM 154 Yon-Courtin]~~; urges the Commission to take decisive action accordingly;

14a. ***Calls on the Commission to examine, in the context of the implementation of the Digital Single Market Directive, potential abuses by gatekeepers under the DMA in their negotiations with press publishers, in particular whether such negotiations comply with the FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) obligations, ensuring equitable remuneration, transparent terms, and non-discriminatory access to online audiences [AM 159 Yon-Courtin];***

~~14b. ***Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies [AM 160 Dibrani et al.];***~~

14eb. ***Calls on the Commission to make full use of Article 13 of the DMA to address any circumvention by gatekeepers of their obligations under Articles 5 and 6 of the DMA [AM 163 Dibrani and Papandreou];***

Antitrust

15. Urges the Commission to ***make appropriate use of [AM 168 Squarta]*** interim measures to stop any practices that harm competition, especially in fast-evolving digital markets; calls on the Commission to modernise Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Implementing Regulation (EC) 773/2004 ~~*in its upcoming review to improve the efficiency, legal certainty and proportionality of EU antitrust enforcement; supports a clarified especially regarding the use of framework for interim measures in cases of serious and irreparable harm to competition, with appropriate due process safeguards [AM 167 Ferber];*~~

15a. ***Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations [AM 166 Navarrete, AM 181 Dibrani et al.]; calls for binding procedural time limits on antitrust investigations to prevent undue delays that harm legal certainty and the rights of defence [AM167 Ferber];***

15b. ***Urges the Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the deterrent effect of its fines; insists that sanctions must be sufficiently high to surpass the illicit economic benefit derived from the infringement [AM 184 Navarrete];***

15c. ***Stresses the importance of effective actions for damages as a complement to public antitrust enforcement, ensuring that victims of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can obtain full compensation; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure the effective implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU (Antitrust Damages Directive) and to remove remaining barriers to private enforcement [AM 202 Schwab];***

16. Reaffirms the need for strong ***and effective*** cooperation between the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) within the European Competition Network (ECN) ~~*as well as with relevant private and public stakeholders and consumer organisations [AM 178 Andresen]; underlines that NCAs must remain politically independent and adequately resourced, and that the ECN+ Directive should be fully and consistently transposed and implemented across all Member States ; calls for enhanced convergence of enforcement standards, timely information-sharing, and clear allocation of competences to avoid duplicative proceedings [AM 174 Ferber];*~~

stresses that the ECN needs to move towards a fully integrated form of cooperation, with a view to enhancing cost efficiency and improving the handling of cross-border aspects, including by enabling joint investigations and joint decision-making; calls the ECN to further guide companies, especially SMEs, in applying the competition rulebook [AM 175 Yon-Courtin];

16a. Calls on the Commission and National Competition Authorities to establish easily accessible and SME-friendly complaint mechanisms for anti-competitive practices, ensuring the swift and effective handling of cases [AM 186 Aftias];

*17. Notes current investigations of ~~third-country based US-based~~ [AM 190 Falcone] companies, including the Commission's preliminary investigation into Visa and Mastercard fees; calls on the Commission to *ensure that the payments market remains competitive, transparent and accessible for consumers and businesses* ~~continue this investigation and act to preserve European competition~~; emphasises the need to review the Interchange Fee Regulation to *assess its effectiveness in addressing* ~~address~~ rising ~~card-scheme~~ fees *and ensure a competitive and transparent market for Europeans*; calls on the Commission to conclude ongoing investigations in the payments sector without undue delay [AM 189 Ferber]; emphasises that the digital euro is a crucial opportunity to [AM 187 Andresen] reduce the overreliance on third country card schemes [AM 188 Dibrani et al.], to strengthen competition [AM 193 Falcone] and the Union's strategic autonomy in the payments sector [AM 194 Schwab], including by helping to ensure more competitive pricing conditions for businesses, in particular SMEs;*

~~17a. Notes that the increase in market concentration has an impact on income distribution; stresses that competitive markets help ensure that productivity gains are more broadly shared across the economy and support sustainable competitiveness by strengthening purchasing power, internal demand and human capital formation; [AM 40 Dibrani et al.];~~

17ba. ~~Notes Underlines the importance of competition in the banking sector and completion of the Banking Union; calls on the Commission to use all available instruments to ensure fair competition and monitor trends in the banking sector during high inflation periods; stresses the importance and urgency of the Commission's upcoming report on the Competitiveness of the EU banking sector and recommends to expects the Commission an anticipation of its presentation's deadline to December 31st to adopted the report by July 2026 [AM 199 Falcone]; further notes welcomes the upcoming assessment of the functioning of Directives 2002/87/EC and 2009/138/EC on aspects relating to the level playing field among financial insurance and banking market participants ;~~

17eb. Notes the existence of ~~highly concentrated and oligopolistic~~ ~~markets oligopolies~~ in the provision of certain services that are critical for the EU financial markets participants, such as market aggregators and connectivity providers characterised by limited number of providers and or a significant difficulty to switch from one provider to another one, asymmetrical pricing power to the benefit of the provider, which ultimately inflate costs for investors; further notes that the three largest ~~EU~~ credit rating agencies and the four biggest firms in the audit market still hold market shares of over 90 %; urges the Commission to investigate existing oligopolies and take the appropriate measures to the benefit of EU competition [AM 204 Yon-Courtin];

17d. *Recalls that the ECB has noted that food prices remain high, with a direct and disproportionately particularly affecting vulnerable households consumers [AM 206 Dibrani et al]; expresses concern about the high concentration at certain levels of the agricultural and food supply chain; urges the Commission to assess the scale and impact of buying alliances, and further analyse their effects not only on prices but also on farmers' and agri-food producers' ability to supply healthy, safe, and sustainable products to consumers [AM 196 Yon-Courtin]; ~~urges~~ invites the Commission to ~~adopt~~ assess whether additional guidelines ~~under~~ are needed on the application of Article 102 TFEU on exploitative abuses, including excessive or unfair prices, in order to improve legal certainty and make enforcement more effective in highly concentrated consumer markets [AM 251 Andresen];*

~~17e. Notes the growing adoption of satellite-based connectivity services by airlines and calls on the Commission to closely monitor developments in the provision of in-flight internet services with a view to preventing potential abuses of market power and preserving effective competition in this emerging market [AM 203 Yon-Courtin];~~

COMPROMISE C

Covers AM: 209-249, 252-277,

Merger control

18. Stresses that Europe lacks large-scale companies **capable of competing globally** in numerous key strategic areas [AM 210 Dibrani et al]; ~~considers the emergence of EU champions and scaling up within the single market [AM 210 Dibrani et al.] as a strategic EU imperative to mobilise investments, drive competitiveness, invest in innovation [AM 214 Fernández et al., AM 215 López-Istúriz White et al.] and enable European firms to compete effectively on global markets, as highlighted by the Letta report; stresses that the completion of the internal market and the removal of internal barriers remain a key priorities in this regard; notes that structural barriers to scaling up within the Union may result in innovative European undertakings being acquired by non-EU players, with potential negative effects on long-term competition and innovation capacity in the Union [AM 212 Winzig]; considers therefore that merger control should take full account of **global competitive dynamics, international market definitions and the ability of European firms to invest in innovation [AM 211 Ferber];** ~~considers scale scaling up within the single market [AM 210 Dibrani et al.] as a strategic EU imperative to mobilise investments, drive competitiveness [AM 214 Fernández et al., AM 215 López-Istúriz White et al.], as highlighted by the Letta report, for competing effectively on global markets and; stresses that the completion of the internal market and the removal of internal barriers remains a key priorityies;~~~~
- 18a. **Considers that competition policy should not create unnecessary obstacles for companies that need to scale up in order to compete globally, while noting that not all EU companies are in need of scaling up; underlines that the EU thrives on the vital link between big and small enterprises [AM 210 Dibrani et al]; considers that competitive scale should primarily result from fair competition, robust antitrust enforcement and deepening the single market, which are the foundation of the EU social market economy and remain the true driver for innovation [AM 209 Andresen];**
19. Calls on the Commission to apply ~~merger policy competition policies [AM 222 Ferber]~~ dynamically, **based on an economic and legal assessment,** analysing the full concept of consumer welfare in the competitive assessment and to consider broader economic effects following a merger [AM 220 López-Istúriz White et al., AM 221 Navarrete], adapt them to new market realities including digital ecosystems, AI, energy and defence [AM 222 Ferber], and analyse the effects of concentrations in the long-term [AM 220 López-Istúriz White et al.,] with a forward-looking approach [AM 223 Squarta]; encourages the Commission to continue to monitor the evolution of market power in Europe [AM 224 Falcone], including their impact on sustainability, innovation and long-term resilience [AM226 Andresen]; ~~including their impact on, workers, sustainability, innovation and long-term resilience [AM226 Andresen];~~
20. Calls for an ambitious **and evidence-based** ~~capable of competing globally~~ revision of the EU merger guidelines so they are better aligned with **new market realities and** the EU's ~~industrial and sectoral policy objectives~~ **priorities in fostering a more resilient and competitive Europe** while continuing to safeguard a high level of consumer welfare; insists that while **remaining grounded in competition analysis and** safeguarding **fair effective** competition on **national markets and within the Single Market,** merger control

should ~~assess not obstruct take due account of the strategic importance of~~ pan-European mergers ~~in a forward looking manner and ensure that any consolidation~~ creating ‘EU champions’ ~~enhances consumer welfare, market contestability and long term resilience,~~ particularly in key sectors such as telecoms, banking, payments, ~~defence~~ and energy; ~~calls for the new merger control guidelines to ensure legal certainty for businesses in creating pan-European players fostering pro competitiveness scaling up, while restricting EU governments ensuring that national interventions powers, including veto powers, to are used only the strictly necessary in duly justified and proportionate cases~~ [AM 234 Yon-Courtin];

21. Calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking *and dynamic* approach [AM 242 Ferber] to mergers, taking efficiency gains, *including for example economies of scale and sustainability gains,* into account *as early as possible in the procedure* [AM 247 Yon-Courtin], *while ensuring transparency and predictability and* [AM 243 Squarta] allowing companies to form alliances when they contribute to innovation, climate, resilience, *and* security, ~~and fair employment conditions,~~ and *which* reflects an *approach towards the assessment of market power and* [AM 245 Falcone] sector-specific realities beyond ~~short-term~~ prices and market shares ~~[AM 248 Navarrete], including effects on wages and working employment conditions;~~
22. Recalls that competition safeguards consumer choice, *market diversity and affordable prices* [AM 253 Andresen, AM 257 Ferber]; ~~notes Netflix’s and Warner Bros. Discovery Stockholders decision on Apr 23, 2026 , approving the Transaction with Paramount Skydance³; Paramount Skydance’s interest in acquiring proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery and the growing consolidation in the cultural sector~~ [AM 253 Andresen]; ~~calls on the Commission to apply rigorous merger control in the for a thorough review of future~~ audiovisual and media sector mergers, ~~monitoring the impact of market consolidation in the internal market and enable European players to scale up~~ [AM 257 Ferber];
23. *Notes that online platforms under the scope of the DMA have acquired nearly 700 smaller companies since 2000, while only 19 of these transactions were notified to the Commission, as most fell below the turnover-based notification thresholds* [AM 259 Andresen, AM 268 Saramo]; ~~calls on the Commission to detect and adapt regulation in order to~~ [AM 262 Navarrete] prevent ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e. when a company acquires control of an innovative company to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition), particularly in *digital* [AM 265 Fernández, AM 264 Ferber], AI, *pharma* [AM 261 Falcone] and other strategic sectors; *upholds that a single market legal base should be added to the EU Merger Regulation in case of a review, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act* [AM 260 Dibrani et al.]; urges the Member States to give national competition authorities ‘call in’ powers so they can review mergers and acquisitions, if this is not already the case, *while ensuring legal certainty and avoiding undue burden on SMEs and start-ups* [AM 263 Squarta];
- 23a. *Acknowledges the increasing trend of foreign investment and multi-club ownership in European sports, as well as the rise of dynamic ticket pricing, and calls on the Commission to take into account the implications of this development when supporting efforts to safeguard the financial integrity and competitive balance of European sport; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure strong enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and to carefully assess potential distortions of the*

³ <https://www.wbd.com/news/warner-bros-discovery-stockholders-approve-transaction-paramount-skydance>

internal market, as well as the impact on the European values-based Sport Model consider all regulatory options, including the prohibition of dynamic pricing at live sports and cultural events in the Digital Fairness Act, with a view to protecting consumers and upholding the social and public value of sport and culture [AM 274 Andresen];

COMPROMISE D

Covers AM: 278-313

State aid

- 24-. *Underlines the need for a thorough analysis of State aid, particularly for companies operating in strategic sectors such as energy, technology, and innovation; stresses the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of State aid in agriculture, logistics, and transport [AM 290 Falcone]; notes the divergent fiscal capacities of Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field and calls on the Commission to monitor these effects; considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with Union law and principles as well as including EU environmental and social policy objectives such as the Green Deal and the Pillar of Social Rights [AM 286 Dibrani et al.];*
- ~~24-. Calls on Member States to exclude companies established in countries listed on the Union's list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, as adopted by the Council, from access to State aid, and to take appropriate measures in this regard [AM286 Andresen];~~
24. Welcomes the Clean Industrial *Deal* State Aid Framework (CISAF); calls for CISAF to be implemented in a way that *should remain targeted and proportionate* and ensures [AM 281 Squarta] minimum burden on Member States, *and* prevents ~~them from engaging in~~ subsidy races, *and preserves the integrity of the internal market, and while includings* strong safeguards on transparency, proportionality and environmental effectiveness [AM 279 Andresen];
- 24a. *Recalls that temporary, targeted State aid can be appropriate in times of crisis; reiterates the importance of the State Aid Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework CISAF in supporting vulnerable sectors, in the context of rapidly increasing fuel prices due to the current geopolitical situation; Notes nevertheless the European Court of Auditors' findings (Special Report 21/2024) identifying shortcomings in the Commission's monitoring of State aid in times of crisis [AM 303 Ferber]; and calls on the Commission for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency in line with the European Court of Auditors' recommendations [AM 284 Falcone];*
- 24b. *Notes that more than three quarters of State aid is concentrated in only two Member States, highlighting risks of fragmentation and an uneven level playing field in the internal market [AM 293 Schwab];*
- 24c. *Hhighlights the role of State aid as a tool to reduce economic disparities between the most developed EU regions and islands, inland areas, outermost regions, economically disadvantaged zones, and all parts of the EU affected by natural constraints; calls for greater flexibility and fewer restrictions on State aid for the EU's islands and more vulnerable regions [AM 291 Falcone];*
25. Expects the review of the General Block Exemption Regulation to, *solve the current issues regarding the definition of Undertaking in Difficulty* modernise and simplify State aid rules in order to reduce red tape and boost the EU's competitiveness; *welcomes*

the opening of the public consultation to collect input on the scope and content of the review [AM 295 Falcone];

26. Welcomes the adoption of a revised *Decision on Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) Decision* [AM 299 Ferber] to enable Member States to support *the provision of decent, sustainable, energy-efficient, socially inclusive and* [AM 298 Falcone; AM 300 Andresen] affordable housing projects *also for middle-income households* [AM 301 Dibrani et al.]; to enable Member States to support *the provision of decent, sustainable, energy-efficient, socially inclusive and* [AM 298 Falcone; AM 300 Andresen] affordable housing projects *also for middle-income households* [AM 301 Dibrani et al.]; *calls on the Commission to monitor the implementation of the revised SGEI Decision and to assess whether the thresholds and conditions are sufficiently flexible to meet Member States' needs; calls for simplified notification procedures for SGEI-related State aid measures that do not present significant competition risks* [AM 299 Ferber];

26a. Invites the Commission to assess the impact of market concentrations in the real estate sector and related markets, such as construction and property management, to ensure that effective competition helps contain prices and improve access to housing [AM 306 Falcone];

- 26b. Notes the distortive effects of aggressive tax planning and of tax systems, including preferential tax agreements, on fair competition, as they may stifle innovation and jeopardise the contestability of markets, especially for SMEs; welcomes the Commission's recommendation of 14 July 2020 to not grant financial support to companies with links to tax havens, while protecting honest taxpayers; Notes that preferential tax arrangements may distort competition and undermine the level playing field in the single market; calls for companies established in countries listed on the Union's list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, as adopted by the Council, to be excluded from receiving State aid and invites the Commission to assess whether the current recovery and allocation framework provides appropriate incentives to prevent such practices, and recalls that addressing them contributes to broader efforts to combat aggressive tax planning and tax haven practices-[AM286 Andresen; AM 304 Dibrani et al.];**

Parliamentary involvement

27. Deplores the lack of information it receives on the revision and implementation of competition rules *and stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy* [AM 308 Dibrani et al]; ~~28. further-Emphasises the need to ensure for~~ transparency with *the Parliament on* ~~about~~ all discussions with non-EU countries that may affect DMA enforcement;
28. *Calls in that context for a structured and regular dialogue between the Commission and the European Parliament on competition policy, including insists it receives all the information it requires in a timely manner and is fully involved in on the review revision and implementation of competition rules; calls on the Commission to provide Parliament's competent committee with timely and comprehensive information on significant enforcement decisions, legislative proposals, and significant major soft-law instruments; calls for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement to formalise the European Parliament's role in competition policy oversight, including consultation on priority-setting for guidelines and frameworks* [AM 307 Ferber];

- 28a. *Cautions on the over-reliance on soft-law instruments such as guidance and temporary frameworks in which the Parliament's involvement is limited; invites the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7)(2) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure [AM 308 Dibrani et al];*
29. Promotes the exchange of best practice in international forums, such as the International Competition Network and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Competition Committee *and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities while regretting that this has not been sufficiently pursued in the past; notes that insufficient coordination between competition authorities at global level may result in fragmented enforcement, and deplores the missed opportunities to strengthen cooperation through trade agreements with major jurisdictions deplores missed opportunities as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy for the Union to take a leading role at international level in promoting effective competition [AM 309 Andresen];*

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COMPROMISE E

Covers AM: 1-28

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)¹,
- **having regard to Commission report of 28 April 2026 on the Review of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), in accordance with Article 53 (COM(2026)178);**
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)²,
- having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)³,
- having regard to the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings⁴,
- having regard to the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings⁵,
- having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),
- having regard to its resolution of 10 September 2025 on facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report)⁶,
- having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market – Speed, Security, Solidarity: Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (Letta report),
- having regard to the report of 19 January 2026 by Jörg Kukies and Christian Noyer entitled ‘Financing Innovative Ventures In Europe’,

¹ OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj>.

² OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj>.

³ OJ L 024, 29.1.2004, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj>.

⁴ OJ C 31, 5.2.2004, p. 5.

⁵ OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 6.

⁶ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0185.

- having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),
- having regard to the Commission proposal of 21 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) ([COM\(2026\)0016](#)),
- having regard to the factual summary of the contributions received in the context of the public consultation on the review of the horizontal and the non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, published on 29 October 2025,
- having regard to Commission staff working document of 13 October 2025 entitled ‘Evaluation of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 on the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees’ ([SWD\(2025\)0330](#)),
- having regard to the Commission staff working document of 13 October 2025 entitled ‘Executive summary of the evaluation of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (SWD(2025)0331),
- having regard to the Commission study entitled ‘Ex post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies’⁷,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market⁸ (Foreign Subsidies Regulation),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 9 January 2026 entitled ‘Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market’ ([C\(2026\)0042](#)),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ ([COM\(2025\)0085](#)),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 4 July 2025 entitled ‘Framework for State Aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal (Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework)’ (C(2025)7600),
- having regard to Commission staff working document of 4 November 2025 accompanying the Commission communication on a Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework ([SWD\(2025\)0850](#)),
- having regard to Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2630 of 16 December 2025 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to

⁷ European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, *Ex post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies*, 2025, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/53e9348d-4f11-46ef-9098-526e24313ee8_en?filename=kd0125000enn_ex-post_evaluation_antitrust_remedies_study_e-version.pdf.

⁸ OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj>.

State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest and repealing Decision 2012/21/EU⁹ (SGEI Decision), and the Annex thereto,

- **Having regard to the Commission Report of 5 May 2026 entitled “Report on Competition Policy 2025” (COM(2026)180);**
- *having regard to the report of 18 December 2025 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2025 edition’ [AM 1 Dibrani et al],*
- *having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,*
- *having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0000/2026),*
- A. ~~*Ae. —whereas fair and open competition is an essential element for the proper functioning of the single market, job creation, consumer protection, development of businesses and growth of companies, especially SMEs, and consumer protection [AM 19 Falcone, AM 20 Benjumea], and whereas competition policy should primarily aim at ensuring effective competition and consumer welfare, while remaining coherent with other Union policies [AM 17 Squarta],*~~
 - Aa. *whereas EU competition policy must be forward-looking, foster EU solutions and innovation, and protect consumers,*
 - ~~*Ae. —whereas fair and open competition is an essential element for the proper functioning of the single market, job creation, development of business and growth of companies, especially SMEs, and consumer protection [AM 19 Falcone, AM 20 Benjumea],*~~
 - Ad. *whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) form the backbone of the European economy and competition policy must take into account their specific needs, ensuring that compliance obligations and enforcement procedures do not place disproportionate burdens on them [AM 16 Ferber],*
- B. *whereas safeguarding the single market requires strong, robust, predictable and non-discriminatory uncompromising competition rules, that are applied equally to all market actors, and that must be insulated from undue political interference of any kind, and resistance to external influence, particularly from the United States [AM 4 Ferber, AM 8 Dibrani et al.],*
- Ba. *whereas increasing market concentration has an impact on income distribution, while competitive markets help ensure that productivity gains are more broadly shared across the economy and support sustainable competitiveness by strengthening purchasing power, internal demand and human capital formation [AM 40 Dibrani et al.];***
- Ba. *whereas the institutional and operational independence of National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and European enforcement is a prerequisite for the credibility and effectiveness of competition policy; whereas safeguarding their decision-making processes from political interference or private-sector pressure is essential to ensure***

⁹ OJ L, 2025/2630, 19.12.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/2630/oj>.

legal certainty, uphold the Rule of Law, and maintain a level playing field across the single market [AM 21 Navarrete],

- Bb. ~~underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base with a,~~ whereas the report by Mario Draghi identifies three main areas for action, namely, first, closing the innovation gap, secondly, establishing a joint plan to ensure both decarbonisation and competitiveness, reflecting the Union's strong industrial and innovation base and its comparative advantage in green technologies, and, finally, increasing security and reducing dependencies ~~but that sustained efforts are needed, in order to retain that advantage~~ [AM 23 Dibrani et al],*
- Bc. ~~whereas in this context the fragmented energy market drives up prices and weakens competition,~~ while current geopolitical tensions may further increase vulnerabilities, and whereas deeper integration of the internal energy market, stronger interconnections and effective enforcement of competition law can increase efficiency, and current geopolitical tensions may worsen this, creating an opportunity to build a resilience and cross-border participation fully integrated energy market with pan-European players to increase efficiency, reduce dependencies on third country suppliers and reduce costs to consumers [AM 14 Yon-Courtin],*
- Bd. ~~whereas in parallel the rapid development of AI, such as generative artificial intelligence systems are significantly reshaping competitive dynamics, market structures, value chains and user access to digital services across the Union, with potential implications for competition within digital markets~~ [AM 15 Schwab],*